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Comments and Casenotes
TORT LIABILITY OF MOTORIST TO GUEST
Dashiell v. Moore'
Plaintiff-appellee was injured while riding either as
an invited guest or as a hitch-hiker in an automobile owned
and operated by defendant-appellant. The accident from
which plaintiff's injuries arose resulted when defendant's
car, while proceeding, at about dusk, with headlights burn-
ing and at a lawful speed on the right side of the road,
struck a mule astray on the highway. As a result of that
collision the car was made to swerve into another motor
vehicle approaching from the opposite direction. When
the mishap occurred the defendant was in the act of tun-
ing a radio installed on the dash of his car; he testified,
however, that in doing so his eyes never left the road, but
in spite of this uninterrupted vigilance he failed to see the
mule. Plaintiff, an infant of nineteen years, by his mother
and next friend, recovered a judgment against his host for
injuries received. On appeal, held: Affirmed. The custom
of hitch-hiking and its incidents are, in Maryland, "affected
by no statutory rule, but are governed by the common-law
rule that one whose fault causes injury to another who is
himself free from fault is subject to liability to the person
injured." The evidence, however, permitted a finding that
the plaintiff's status at the time of the accident was that
of an invitee to whom the defendant owed a duty to use
reasonable care to avoid injuring him, and defendant's fail-
ure to discover the presence of the mule on the road in
time to avoid the accident was sufficient to support a find-
ing that defendant failed to fulfill that duty. On the other
hand, the facts were not such as would support a charge
that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as
a matter of law in either failing to see the mule himself
or to protest against the defendant's tuning the radio while
driving.'
L 177 Md. 657, 11 A. (2d) 640 (1940).
2 The Court seemed to recognize that the evidence of negligence was
slight, and consisted of the momentary (approximately ten seconds) failure
to keep an adequate lookout. The plaintiff's own testimony showed a
similar lapse, either from watching the defendant adjust the radio, or
perhaps because his view was obscured by the bended head of the de-
fendant.
DASHIELL v. MOORE
The degree of care owed by a motorist to an invited
guest in Maryland was established in Fitzjarrel v. Boyd.'
The rule there adopted was that the owner or operator
of an automobile owes to a guest the duty "to use ordinary
care not to increase the danger of riding with him or to
create any new danger."' In the Fitzjarrel case the plain-
tiff had been invited by the defendant to accompany him
on a ride in the latter's automobile. In the course of the
ride, the machine skidded, struck a telegraph pole and
overturned and the plaintiff was injured. In the ensuing
action, the plaintiff charged that the accident was due to
the defendant's negligence in attempting to pass another
car at a high rate of speed and against the timely remon-
strances of the plaintiff. One of the prayers offered by the
defendant was to the effect that the plaintiff was an in-
vited guest in the defendant's private automobile and that
the defendant should not be held liable unless the Court
should find from the evidence that the plaintiff was in-
jured by the defendant's gross or wilful negligence. The
trial court refused the prayer embodying this argument
and on appeal it was held that the rule of gross or wilful
negligence sought to be applied was not the correct rule
applicable to the case and the prayer was, in consequence,
properly refused. The Court of Appeals cited with ap-
proval the important decisions of Beard v. Klusmeier5 and
Patnode v. Foote' and several other decisions7 asserting
the rule adopted in the Fitzjarrel case and quoted approv-
ingly from Huddy on Automobiles, as follows:
"Although he pays nothing for riding, he is, never-
theless, in the care and custody of the owner or driver
of the machine and is entitled to a reasonable degree of
care for his safety. If the driver has negligently run
into some obstacle on the highway and thereby in-
jured the guest, undoubtedly the owner' and the driver
would be liable to civil suit for damages. One who
3 123 Md. 497, 91 A. 547 (1914).
' 123 Md. 497, 505, 91 A- 547, 549 (1914).
6158 Ky. 153, 164 S. W. 319, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1100, Ann. Cas. 1915 D
342 (1914).
1153 App. Div. 494, 138 N. Y. Supp. 221 (1912).
Pigeon v. Lane, 80 Conn. 237, 67 A. 886, 11 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 371
(1907) ; Birch v. City of New York, 190 N. Y. 397, 83 N. E. 51, 18 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 595 (1907) ; Mayberry v. Sivey, 18 Kan. 291 (1877) ; Lochhead v.
Jensen, 42 Utah 99, 129 P. 347 (1912).
'In Maryland the owner as such would not be liable except on a master-
servant or principal-agent theory. See Price v. Miller, 165 Md. 578, 582,
169 A. 800, 801 (1934), and Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 20, 152 A.
498, 499, 72 A. L. R. 449, 451 (1930).
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voluntarily accepts an invitation to ride as a guest
in an automobile does not relinquish his right of pro-
tection from personal injury caused by carelessness,
and it should be understood by owners of motor ve-
hicles that they assume quite a serious responsibility
when they invite others to ride with them, especially
persons who by reason of weaknesses are subject to
injury from slight causes."9
The view thus expressed in the Fitzjarrel case and fol-
lowed in the instant case conforms to the weight of com-
mon law authority in this country. One of the leading
cases supporting the majority view, and as noted above
one of the cases expressly followed in Fitzjarrel v. Boyd,
is Beard v. Klusmeier. There the plaintiff was riding in
a car owned and operated by the defendant as the latter's
invited guest. When another machine, proceeding in the
same direction, attempted to pass, the defendant increased
his speed and began to race the other car. Plaintiff there-
upon protested and begged to be allowed to get out of the
automobile, but defendant refused to accede to her request.
Suddenly the car crashed into a pile of building materials
stacked in the street and the plaintiff was injured. In reply
to an appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff, the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals recognized that the case presented
the question of whether it was the duty of the defendant,
under the circumstances, to exercise (a) ordinary care,
or (b) slight care. After a careful review of the authori-
ties, and relying heavily on Patnode v. Foote, a New York
case, the Court held that the correct rule applicable to the
facts before it was that the defendant's duty to the plain-
tiff was "to use ordinary care not to increase the danger of
her riding with him, or to create any new danger."'" The
Court then went on to observe that "one who invites an-
other to ride is not bound to furnish a safe vehicle or a
safe horse or a safe automobile;" but if the driver fails to
use ordinary care in driving the automobile, he thereby
creates a new danger for which he is liable.' 12
9 H UDDY, AUTo oBILEs, See. 113, as quoted in Fitzjarrel v. Boyd, supra,
n. 3.
21 158 Ky. 153, 164 S. W. 319, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1100. Ann. Cas. 1915 D
342 (1914).
11 It has been held, however, that where the motorist knows or should
know that the car is defective and fails to exercise the appropriate care,
he is liable to his guest for negligence. See Ingerick v. Mess. 63 F. (2d)
233, 95 A. L. R. 415 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
12 158 Ky. 153, 164 S. W. 319, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1100, Ann. Cas. 1915 D
342 (1914).
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There are, however, two jurisdictions, namely, Massa-
chusetts and Georgia, which adhere to the proposition,
sometimes referred to as the Massachusetts rule, that, inde-
pendent of statute, gross negligence must be shown in order
to hold the motorist liable for injury to his invited guest.
The courts following this view seem to ground their rea-
soning on an analogy between the gratuitous transportation
of human beings in an automobile and a gratuitous bail-
ment of personal property.'"
Massaletti v. Fitzroy" is one of the leading cases setting
forth the minority view. In that case the plaintiff, at the
defendant's invitation, accompanied the defendant on a
ride in the latter's motor car. Through the negligence of
the chauffeur, the machine overturned and the plaintiff
was injured. In the suit by the guest against the car owner
the jury found that the chauffeur acted as the defendant's
servant 15 and that the accident was caused by the negli-
gence of the chauffeur. The verdict, however, was for the
defendant and this the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court refused to disturb, saying:
"Justice requires that the one who undertakes to
perform a duty gratuitously should not be under the
same measure of obligation as one who enters upon
the same undertaking for pay. There is an inherent
difficulty in stating the difference between the measure
of duty which is assumed in the two cases. But justice
requires that, to make out liability in case of a gra-
tuitous undertaking, the plaintiff ought to prove a ma-
terially greater degree of negligence than he has to
prove where the defendant is to be paid for doing the
same thing."'"
The decision contains an extensive review of the authori-
ties with many cases on both sides cited and commented
upon, including Fitzjarrel v. Boyd, Beard v. Klusmeier and
Patnode v. Foote, with which latter, the Massachusetts
Court of course disagreed, placing their incorrectness on
the ground of their failure to recognize the existence of
" For a criticism of this view see Munson v. Rupker, 96 Ind. App. 15, 151
N. E. 101 (1926) mentioned at 47 A. L. R. 328.
" 228 Mass. 487, 118 N. E. 168, L. R. A. 1918 C 264, Ann. Cas. 1918 B
1088, 18 N. C. C. A. 690 (1917).
" Discussion of the doctrine of Respondeat Superior has been Inten-
tionally omitted from this casenote as that subject presents a separate fileld
for examination.
16 228 Mass. 487, 118 N. V. 168, L. R. A. 1918 C 264, Ann. Cas. 1918 B
1088, 18 N. C. C. A. 690 (1917).
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degrees of negligence. 7 What constitutes gross negligence
within the contemplation of the Massachusetts rule is a
matter depending upon the facts of the individual case.'8
It was the Massachusetts rule, in substance, it may be
recalled, that was invoked by the defendant in the Fitz-
jarrel case; the Maryland Court, however, refused to per-
mit the rule to be applied in that decision. This clearly
was an express rejection of the minority view, and in the
instant case, the Court, in effect, has reaffirmed its adher-
ence to the majority view by holding that the defendant
was bound to use reasonable care to avoid injuring the
plaintiff. Consistent also with these holdings which coin-
cide with the weight of authority is the Maryland Court's
statement in Washington, Baltimore and Annapolis Rail-
road Co. v. State9 to the effect that the owner of an auto-
mobile who is not a common carrier but who operates the
car for his own pleasure and purposes should not be held
to the highest degree" of care and skill practicable under
all the circumstances for the care and safety of his guest.
The Court went on to quote again with seeming approval
Huddy's statement2' that a gratuitous guest is entitled to
a reasonable degree of care for his safety.
One interesting aspect of the instant case is the status
accorded the plaintiff by the Court. An examination of
the record and briefs reveals some conflict in testimony and
theory of the parties as to precisely what was the plaintiff's
status in the defendant's automobile. The defendant's
testimony and brief treat the plaintiff as a hitch-hiker on
the ground that the defendant stopped in response to what
he believed was a signal from the plaintiff and his friend,
in the manner of hitch-hikers, indicating a desire for a
17 In W., B. & A. R. Co. v. State, 136 Md. 103, 111 A. 164 (1920), the
Court recognized the difference in duty owed by the common or paid carrier
and the gratuitous carrier. It has; however, refused to sub-divide the
guest cases as is done in Massachusetts. See also Armour & Co. v.
Leasure, 177 Md. 393, 410, 9 A. (2d) 572, 580 (1939) where the Court
points out that the standard is really that of reasonable care under the
particular factual conditions. For a comment on the "degrees of care"
doctrine, see note, The Tort Liability of the Proprietor of a Passenger
Elevator (1939) 3 Md. L. Rev. 353, 358, n. 17.
18 For a discussion of this subject, see Corish, The Avtomobtle Guest
(1934), 14 Boston Univ. L. Rev. 728.
19136 Md. 103, 117, 111 A. 164, 169 (1920).
20 In making this declaration the Court expressly disapproved an earlier
ruling on a prayer in United Rwys. & Elec. Co. v. Crain, 123 Md. 332, 91 A.
405 (1914). The prayer allowed in that case stated that it was the duty
of the driver (of a private automobile) to exercise the highest degree of
skill practicable under all circumstances for the care and safety of a
passenger, who in that case was a gratuitous guest.
"HuDDY, loc. cit. supra, n. 9.
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ride. The plaintiff maintained that although he and his
friend had stationed themselves on the outskirts of town
and attempted to "hitch" a ride, their efforts had been
unsuccessful, and that they had abandoned their solicita-
tions and were on their way back to the center of town
when the defendant came along and, without signal from
them, invited them to get in his car. The Court concluded
that the evidence permitted a finding that the plaintiff was
an invitee, yet the language used in other passages of the
opinion suggests that the plaintiff might also be regarded
as either a self-invited guest,22 a hitch-hiker,23 or as a guest
at sufferance.24 The willingness of the Court in permitting
recovery under this latitude of status suggests the possi-
bility that in Maryland there does not exist the distinction
drawn by some courts between the invited guest and one
who himself requests the motorist to carry him. Such
courts have held that to this latter class of occupant the
motorist owes no duty other than to refrain from wilful
or wanton acts.25 This rule, which thus imposes a lesser
obligation on the motorist with respect to the self-invited
guest, represents the minority view. The basis for the
refusal by the majority of the courts to recognize any
distinction between invitee and self-invited guest has been
set out by the Mississippi Court in Green v. Maddox26 as
follows:
"There was a division among the earlier authorities
on this question, but the modern decisions are almost
unanimous in the holding, with which we agree, that
there is no admissible distinction between the self-
invited guest, one who himself invites the favor, and
the guest who is first invited by the host, for in either
case the person being transported is accepted by the
owner or authorized driver into his care and keeping,
and the latter is in control of an instrumentality which
when put in motion becomes dangerous if not handled
with proper caution, whereas the person being trans-
ported is without control or power to save himself
from the illegitimate dangers created by the negli-
gence of the driver in acting otherwise than with due
and reasonable care. '27
22 177 Md. 657, 664, 11 A. (2d) 640, 644 (1940).
23 177 Md. 657, 664, 11 A. (2d) 640, 644 (1940).
2' 177 Md. 657, 671, 11 A. (2d) 640, 646 (1940).
25 HUDDY, CYCLOPEDIA oF AuTomoBIE LAW (1931) Sec. 134, n. 56, citing
Lutvin v. Dopkus, 94 N. J. Law 64, 108 A. 862 (1920).
" 168 Miss. 171, 151 So. 160 (1933).
27 168 Miss. 171, 151 So. 160, 161 (1933).
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As intimated by the Maryland Court in its opinion in
the instant case, the problem noted here is affected in some
states by the so-called guest statutes. These statutes, by
declaring that any person riding in a motor vehicle as a
guest or by invitation and not for hire assumes as between
the motorist and himself the ordinary negligence of the
motorist, have the effect of relieving the motorist of lia-
bility for injury to his guest unless he has been guilty of
conduct identifiable as or equivalent to gross negligence.2
8
The requisite misconduct is variously described in the
several forms of statutes now in force in this country, as
"gross negligence", "wilful misconduct", "intoxication",
"intentional act", "heedlessness", "reckless disregard of
rights", "wanton misconduct" and various combinations of
these epithets.
A person's status as a guest is determined under prac-
tically all of the statutes by the test of whether or not
there was compensation or payment for the accommoda-
tion. The term "guest" is defined in the Arkansas statute,
however, as a "self-invited guest or guest at sufferance".29
At first blush this would seem less comprehensive in scope
than the other statutes; however, the Supreme Court of
Arkansas has held in Ward v. George3" that the statute
applied to persons riding in another's car with or without
an invitation to do so, thus erasing the distinction that the
bare language of the statute suggests. In respect to this
problem of determining who is a guest under the statutes,
Blashfield has said that one important element is "the
identity of the person or persons advantaged by the car-
riage. If, in its direct operation, it confers a benefit only
on the person to whom the ride is given, and no benefits,
other than such as are incidental to hospitality, companion-
ship, or the like, upon the person extending the invitation,
the passenger is a guest within the statutes; but, if his
carriage tends to the promotion of mutual interests of both
himself and the driver and operator for their common bene-
fit, or if it is primarily for the attainment of some objective
or purpose of the operator, he is not a guest within the
meaning of such enactments".$' By this test and in the
light of the purpose of such legislation to narrow the field
28 Thus it appears that the guest statute is essentially a codification of
the Massachusetts (minority) rule.
29 Pope's Digest of the Statutes of Arkansas (1937) Sec. 1303.
80 195 Ark. 216, 112 S. W. (2d) 30 (1938).
i1 BLASHFIELD, CYcLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE, Sec. 2292.
See also MALCOLM, AuToM ouna GUEST LAW STATUTES AND DECISIONS (1937)
Secs. 21-27.
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of persons to whom the motorist is liable, it would seem
that under the statutes no distinction would exist between
invitee, self-invited guest, hitch-hiker or guest at suffer-
ance.
The history of this statutory movement is relatively
recent. Its progress has been generally attributed to the
automobile liability insurance companies who have sought
relief from the fast growing burden of mala fide suits
brought by automobile guests, often amicable in nature
and with the assistance of their defending hosts.3 2  The
earliest guest statutes were enacted in 1927 in the states
of Connecticut, Iowa and Oregon. Connecticut, however,
is no longer among the ranks, having repealed its guest
law in 1937. Today there are twenty-eight states33 which
have adopted and not repealed such statutes. In one of
these states, Kentucky, the guest law has been declared
unconstitutional 34 and is therefore ineffective. The consti-
tutionality of the Connecticut statute, which before its
repeal, was similar in many respects to existing guest laws,
was upheld by the United States Supreme Court 35 The
statutes of several other states have been challenged on
constitutional grounds but have successfully resisted such
attacks . 6  The record in this respect may be summarized
with the statement that where the guest statutes "do not
wholly deny a gratuitous guest a right of action against
32 MALCOLM, op. cit. 8upra, n. 31, Sec. 4. See also Ward v. George, 195
Ark. 216, 112 S. W. (2d) 30 (1938) in which the Court said the automobile
guest statute was intended to prevent collusive suits where the real de-
fendant was an insurance company and both host and guest were inter-
ested In establishing liability.
as These states are Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware,
Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Mon-
tana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington and
Wyoming.
" Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 534, 49 S. W. (2d) (1932) (two judges
dissenting).
35 Silver v. Silver, 280 U. S. 117, 74 L. Ed. 221, 50 S. Ct. 57, 65 A. L. R.
939 (1929), affirming 108 Conn. 371, 143 A. 240, 65 A. L. R. 943 (1928).
as Birmingham-Tuscaloosa Railway & Utilities Co. v. Carpenter, 194 Ala.
141, 69 So. 626 (1915) (Strictly not a guest law case but affects the prin-
ciple of guest law statutes) ; Robertson v. Robertson, 193 Ark. 669, 101
S. W. (2d) 961 (1937) ; Forsman v. Colton, 136 Cal. App. 97, 28 P. (2d)
429 (1933) ; Gallegher v. Davis, 7 W. W. Harr. 380, 183 A. 620 (Del., 1936)
(upholding amended Delaware statute); Naudzius v. Lahr, 253 Mich.
216, 234 N. W. 581, 74 A. L. R. 1189, 30 N. C. C. A. 179 (1931) ; Rogers v.
Brown, 129 Neb. 9, 260 N. W. 794 (1935) ; Smith v. Williams, 51 Ohio App.
461, 1 N. E. (2d) 643 (1935) ; Perozzi v. Gantere, 149 Ore. 330, 40 P. (2d)
1009 (1935) (upholding constitutionality of amended Oregon statute);
Elkins v. Foster, 101 S. W. (2d) 294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) ; Shea v. Olson,
185 Wash. 143, 53 P. (2d) 615, 186 Wash. 700. 59 P. (2d) 1183, 111 A. L. R.
998 (1936).
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the owner or operator of an automobile for an injury they
are generally held constitutional." 7
The instant case thus affords an opportunity to present
what appears at first glance as a tripartite problem but
which actually resolves itself into a two-sided proposition:
viz. (1) the majority common law view that the motorist
is liable to his guest for simple negligence, and (2) the
minority common law view, which in some states has been
codified in the form of guest statutes, to the effect that the
motorist is liable to his guest only where gross negligence
or the equivalent is shown. Maryland, it is seen, casts
its lot with the first group. Which is the better solution,
it is not the purpose of this note to attempt an answer.
Whether the advantage, provided by the minority view or
the guest statutes, of sometimes stifling collusive suits
which adversely affect the liability insurance companies is
sufficient to offset the cost of surrendering a former right
is another of the countless social problems with respect to
which there are today such strongly opposing views.
DEGREE OF CARE OWED BY A MOTORIST TO
CHILDREN ON THE HIGHWAY - CON-
TRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Bozman v. State, use of Cronhardt'
An action was brought under the local version of Lord
Campbell's Act against Bozman by Cronhardt, the equi-
table plaintiff, for the wrongful death of his infant son,
not quite eight years of age. The boy, astride his bicycle
in broad day-light, came out into Green Spring Avenue, a
concrete highway, from the driveway adjacent to his
grandmother's home, and was struck by the car driven
by the defendant, as he came onto the highway. Defend-
ant, by his own testimony (and that was the only testimony
in the case as to actual speed), was traveling between
thirty-five and forty miles per hour in a forty-five miles
per hour speed zone,2 and was about seventy-five feet from
37 See 111 A. L. R. 1011.
1 177 Md. 151, 9 A. (2) 60 (1939). See also a more recent case, Stafford
v. Zake, 20 A. (2d) 144 (Md., 1941).
2 At the time of the accident (May 30th, 1938), Md. Code Supp. (1935)
Art. 56. See. 194(4) was then in force allowing a 45 m. p. h. speed limit
on rural highways; since then, by Md. Code (1939) Art. 56, Sec. 196(4)
the speed on such highways has been fixed at a 50 m. p. h. maximum.
[VOL. V
